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Value Change in Western European Societies:＊
Results from the European Values Study
Loek Halman＊＊
Introduction
This paper empirically explores the notion that individualization is a major dimension of societal
changes in Europe. It is investigated if there is indeed evidence of the idea that Europeans increasingly
emphasize personal autonomy, individual freedom, and the fragmentation of individual pursuits, at the cost
of collective standards and the fragmentation of individual pursuits. A rather popular understanding of the
process of individualization is that people’s actions and behaviors are increasingly rooted in and
legitimized by people’s own personal preferences, convictions and goals. This growing endeavor to pursue
private aspirations and individual needs is assumed to ultimately result in assigning the highest priority to
personal need fulfillment, self-expression, self-development and personal happiness.
This seems to be a universal (western) process and is triggered and strongly pushed by increasing
levels of education of the population and the greater access they have to information through the mass
media. Rising levels of education increases people’s ‘breath of perspective’ (Gabennesch 1972: 183), their
abilities and cognitive skills, which makes them more critical and independent of the traditional suppliers
of values, norms, and beliefs, and more open to new ideas and arguments, other providers of meanings,
values and norms, and less dependent on traditional institutions and their prescriptions and rules of
behavior and conduct. Rules and prescriptions imposed by authorities and hierarchical institutions are less
and less taken for granted for an increasing number of people.
In advanced, post-industrial society, individuals face a multitude of alternatives as a consequence of
internationalization, transnationalization, and globalization. Technological developments and rapid
innovations in telecommunications, the spread and popularity of computers, the increased mobility of
major companies and people, as well as growing exposure to television, radio, video, films, and internet
etc., have intensified worldwide social relations and flows of information. The world is regarded to have
become a ‘global village,’ in which people encounter a great variety of alternative cultural habits and a
broad range of lifestyles and modes of behavior. Being free and liberated from the constraints imposed by
traditional institutions (e.g., church and religion), people in contemporary globalizing era, in theory, can
pick and choose what they want from an expanding global cultural market and thus, the likelihood that
they select the same options and make the same choices diminishes and therefore the degree of diversity
or pluralism in society increases.
In this paper, value changes in Western European societies are explored, analyzing the survey data
from the European Values Study (EVS) from 1981, 1990, and 1999 (Halman 2001; Inglehart, Basáñez, Díez-
Medrano, Halman & Luijkx 2004; Halman, Inglehart, Díez-Medrano, Luijkx, Moreno & Basáñez 2008; see
also: www.europeanvalues.nl). We investigate whether or not individualization is indeed revealed in
changing values of the Europeans. A first question to be addressed is whether or not a general trend can
be revealed in Europe that indicates the ongoing process of individualization. In other words, it will be
investigated whether individualization is confined to one particular value domain or if it is a broader
process of change that affects all value domains.
Individualization is assumed to not only have pushed values to change in a certain direction, but also
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that it has caused values to become more diverse. It will be argued that increasing diversity or pluralism is
also a consequence of ongoing processes of internationalization and globalization.
This paper starts with some theoretical reflections on the process of individualization and the
formulation of hypotheses about its consequences for people’s basic value orientations. Next, we will
describe the survey data, measures and analytical strategy and in the last two sections, the results of our
analyses are presented and conclusions drawn.
Theoretical reflections and hypotheses
Individualization is a much-debated process of cultural change. There appears little agreement on the
definition and interpretation of individualization and there are different appraisals of the implications of
individualization in general, and the increase of individualism in particular. Defined in a more neutral, not
normative way, individualization denotes ‘the social and historical process in which values, beliefs,
attitudes and behavior are based increasingly on personal choice and are less dependent on tradition and
social institutions’ (Ester, Halman & de Moor 1994: 7; Ester, Mohler & Vinken 2006). People’s attitudes,
ideas, and behaviors, are increasingly dependent upon personal considerations and individual’s
convictions, desires, and preferences that are constantly open to debate, reformulation, and change. In
other words, a process of privatization has occurred meaning that people’s views and actions and
behaviors are rooted increasingly in and legitimized by personal autonomy and individual preferences and
‘relatively free from external constraints’ (Inglehart & Welzel 2005: 47). Particularly with respect to sensitive
issues, such as sexual behaviors and bio-ethical concerns, people are less ‘bound by the moral teachings
imposed by religion’ (Fukuyama 2000: 48). The moral guidance of religion and the churches have come
under strong pressure and rigid moral standards, as imposed by religious leaders, are no longer accepted
as taken for granted. Instead, each individual seems to have become his or her own (moral) guide. The
‘grand world views’ have become irrelevant and the significance of traditional structures and ties, such as
religion, family, class, has receded, enlarging the individual’s freedom and autonomy in shaping personal
life. People have gradually gained autonomy and have grown to be self-decisive and self-reliant, no longer
forced to accept the traditional authorities as taken for granted. The absoluteness of any kind of external
authority, be it religious or secular, has eroded. Authority becomes internalized and deference to authority
pervasively declined (Inglehart 1999).
The diminishing social constraints on the choices that people make seem to delineate a more general
process of the decline of authority and a growing anti-institutional mood. The guidelines and rules
provided by traditional, hierarchical institutions are conflicting with ideas of personal autonomy and
growing individual desires to decide for oneself. Public support for traditional sources of authority, such as
government but also other established institutions have gradually declined (Norris 1999: 24). These strongly
restrict the individual’s freedom and do not match with the emerging need for self-expression, the
increased concern for individual freedom, and self-determination. Inglehart (1977, 1990, 1997; Inglehart &
Welzel 2005) has described this important cultural shift in terms of the rising postmaterialist values. Rising
levels of postmaterialism indicate that self-esteem, self-expression, and personal choices are gaining in
importance whereas materialist goals emphasizing economic and physical security have declined.
Thus, people in modern individualized society are assumed to be basically oriented towards pursuing
their own happiness, self-development, and self-determination. The traditional options are less likely to be
selected by more individualized persons for they are independent and no longer take for granted the rules
and prescriptions imposed by traditional institutions. This process of de-traditionalization is characterized
by a decline of traditional views in a variety of life domains, e.g., male and female roles, morality, religion
on the one hand, and an increased emphasis on values stressing autonomy, individual rights and personal
freedom on the other. In other words, individualization can be regarded as a process of growing autonomy
by which human choices have gradually become liberated from structural constraints and personally more
independent (Beck 1992; 2002).
Following these arguments, we can formulate concrete expectations about the way individualization
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has changed and continues to change European societies and the value orientations of the Europeans. A
key notion of individualization is de-traditionalization (see also Peters 1995; Felling, Peters & Scheepers
2000).
The growing emphasis on autonomy, self-actualization, and self-directedness implies that ‘any external,
superior being or principle that could impose maxims for action’ (Wagner 1994: 8）is rejected by a growing
number of people. Inglehart has argued that the emergence of a sense of security among people in
economically more advanced societies has reduced the need for ‘the reassurance that has traditionally
been provided by absolute belief systems, which purport to provide certainty and the assurance of
salvation, if not in this world at least in the next’ (Inglehart 1997: 80). However, the decline in traditional
religious beliefs is ‘linked with a growing concern for the meaning and purpose of life’ (Inglehart 1997: 80).
What has happened is that the social significance of religious institutions has declined, but also Bryan
Wilson (1982: 150) wrote, it does not mean ‘that most individuals have relinquished all their interest in
religion, even though that may be the case. It maintains no more than that religion ceases to be significant
in the working of the social system’ (see also Dobbelaere 1981, 2002). It is the individual who has become
the main point of reference in the shaping of values, attitudes, and beliefs. Increasingly, people believe in
whatever they themselves want to believe in, which is not necessarily what the Churches tell them to
believe. In other words, traditional dogmatic beliefs have been replaced by a more modern, personalized
way of believing. Some analysts have emphasized this development, which they regard ‘as a shift away
from the traditional churches (...) with larger numbers of people defining and practicing their religiosity in
non－traditional, individualized and institutionally loose ways’ (Berger 2001: 447). Institutional religion is
assumed to have become marginalized and, consequently, to have lost much of its influence on people’s
lives. As such, it seems that the decline in religiosity is mainly confined to institutional decline and does
not indicate a decline in religious beliefs. In many European countries, this has resulted in a situation that
Davie characterized as ‘believing without belonging’ (Davie 2000: 3). This would mean that people in
contemporary advanced society are no longer in need of a church, but can still be religious. Religion has
become privatized, meaning that it has become a matter of individual choice and preferences. Thus, the
traditional religion has lost its central position in society (Berger 1967), and has become one among many
other meaning systems in society and a market of ‘ultimate’ meaning systems has developed from which
the individual can choose freely (Luckmann 1967: 99). Because ‘individuals have liberated themselves from
religious authorities and...their experiences are the basis of their faith’ (Dobbelaere 2002: 190), we can
propose the hypothesis that traditional religious beliefs are fading away slowly.
The guidance of the churches has decreased tremendously, or has disappeared completely in moral
issues. Being free and independent, individuals are no longer accepting as taken for granted the judgments
and the rules imposed by the church. The waning of the dominant position of religion in modernizing
society fostered the establishment of a ‘new morality’ or ‘permissive morality’ (Wilson 1982: 86). Since the
moral guidance of the churches and religion is less self-evident and under heavy pressure, it can be
assumed that people’s religious orientations are no longer, or less strongly, linked to their moral views. In
traditional societies, individual belief systems and religious practices were strongly dependent on the
beliefs of the community and on the prescriptions of the Churches. Cultural and social differentiation
resulted in people increasingly participating in different universes of meaning, each governed by its own
set of values. Within each institutional sphere, norms and values have become functional, rational, and,
above all, autonomous. In this interpretation, secularization can be seen as ‘the repercussion of these
changes on the religious subsystem. It denotes a societal process in which an overarching and
transcendent religious system is reduced to a subsystem of society alongside other subsystems, the
overarching claims of which have a shrinking relevance’ (Dobbelaere 1995: 1; see also Dobbelaere 2002:
166). The processes of differentiation, specialization and professionalization made each social sphere in life
increasingly autonomous and a specialized unit in society with its own set of values and rules (Münch
1990: 443). The churches have lost several of their traditional functions such as schools, hospices, social
welfare, registry of births, marriages and deaths, culture, and organization of leisure (Dogan 1995: 416).
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Institutional domains have become segmented in the sense that within each institutional sphere norms and
values have become functional, rational, autonomous, and withdrawn from the religious sphere. The
‘sacred canopy is more and more restricted’ (Dobbelaere 2002: 23). As a consequence, religion became
marginalized in society and its influence on people’s lives was reduced. In other words, religion has lost its
societal and public functions, and religion has become privatized and marginalized within its own
differentiated sphere (Casanova 1994: 19). The emancipation of the individual, the growing emphasis on
personal autonomy and individual freedom, the de-unification of collective standards and the
fragmentation of private pursuits seem advantageous to ‘a declining acceptance of the authority of
hierarchical institutions, both political and non-political’ (Inglehart 1997: 15).
Thus, citizens are increasingly questioning the traditional sources of (religious) authority and no longer
bound by common moral principles. All in all, it seems reasonable to assume that moral and sexual
choices are increasingly based on personal decisions and lifestyle preferences and less on prescriptions by
the church and church leaders. Thus, personal convictions have grown to be the major sources of people’s
moral convictions. ‘The final authority of ethical behavior is the individual alone’ (Crittenden 1992: 78).
Hence, we can expect that the traditional dogmatic moral rules have diminished in favor of a personal
morality of ‘anything goes.’
In the political sphere, individualization and the emancipation of the individual delineates a decline of
traditional authority and a growing anti-institutional mood. Institutions, and in particular the authoritarian
ones, are regarded to restrict the freedom of the individual to behave and act as he or she prefers and thus
in a highly individualized society, people do not longer want to be ruled by such institutions. Instead
people want to decide for themselves and the guidelines and prescriptions provided by these institutions
conflict with ideas of personal autonomy and individual freedom. The emancipation of the individual, the
growing emphasis on personal autonomy and individual freedom seem advantageous to ‘a declining
acceptance of the authority of hierarchical institutions, both political and non-political’ (Inglehart 1997: 15;
see also Norris 1999; Dalton 2004). Thus, we may expect to find a decline in levels of confidence in
institutions.
It is easy to see the resemblance between the rise of postmaterialist values and growing
individualization. A key component of postmaterialist values is personal autonomy. What Inglehart
describes as the rise of postmaterialist values can be understood easily in terms of increasing levels of
individualization. Materialist values are held by people who give highest priority to physical sustenance and
safety, maintaining order in society, a high rate of economic growth, the need for a strong army, and so
on. Postmaterialists, on the other hand, emphasize self-expression, quality of life, freedom of speech, self-
expression and self-determination (Inglehart 1977, 1990, 1997; Inglehart & Welzel 2005). Rising levels of
postmaterialism indicate that the key issues of individualization, such as self-esteem, self-expression, and
personal choices, are gaining in importance. Therefore, we predict that levels of postmaterialism should
have increased in Europe.
The increased emphasis on personal autonomy makes human relations less bound to traditions, less
likely to be prescribed by social norms, and less enforced by social control. Traditional institutional control
particularly has weakened the control ‘associated with family and domestic ties and gendered
expectations’ (Morgan 1996: 197). The conventional conjugal family increasingly has been regarded as
limiting individual freedom and impeding self-realization and confining intimacy (Elliott 1996: 9). The
proponents of what is called the theory of the ‘second demographic transition’ have argued that the low
levels of fertility in the Western world reflect behavior that is rooted in an ever-growing individualism in
Western societies. In their view, the growing emphasis on the individual affects the traditional family
orientation in the sense that it involves ‘shifts from marriage towards cohabitation, from children to the
adult couple as the focus of a family, from contraception to prevent unwanted births to deliberate self-
fulfilling choices whether and when to conceive a child, and from uniform to widely diversified families
and households’ (Van de Kaa 1987: 9). Demographic trends such as the decreasing attractiveness of
marriage, which is reflected in the decline in the number of marriages and increasing levels of divorce and
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the low number of children, seem indicative of the fundamental shifts in values which has been denoted
in evolutionary terms ‘from altruism to individualism’ (Van de Kaa 1987: 5; Lesthaeghe & Van de Kaa 1986;
Manting 1994; Jansen 2002), suggesting the incompatibility of individualization and the preservation of
traditional familial solidarity. ‘Maintaining family relations is nowadays a matter of choice, not of necessity’
(Inglehart & Welzel 2005: 29; see also Beck 2002). People increasingly opt for themselves and for their
personal benefit, and, as a consequence, not for marriage and traditional family life. Hence, we propose
the hypothesis that traditional family and marital values have declined.
Thus, we expect that individualization has resulted in a decline in traditional orientations. This is what
we refer to as the de-traditionalization hypothesis. Since the decline in traditional views is not expected to
be restricted to only one specific life domain, but will have occurred in all distinct life spheres, ranging
from religion and morality to politics and family life and marriage, we propose a generalization hypothesis
stating that the decline in traditional views has occurred in all life domains.
When individual choices are based on personal convictions and preferences, the predictability of
people’s orientations and behavior should have decreased. It is one of the basic characteristics of post-
modernity that everything is possible and unpredictable. Waters (1994: 206) portrays contemporary society
as follows: ‘We may no longer be living under the aegis of an industrial or capitalist culture which can tell
us what is true, right and beautiful, and also what our place is in the grand scheme, but under a chaotic,
mass-mediated, individual-preference-based culture of post-modernity.’
However, not only the clearly defined patterns of behavior and orientations have departed, the
modern or postmodern individual also faces a multitude of alternatives as a consequence of
internationalization, transnationalization, and globalization. Today’s world is a ‘global village,’ denoting that
the world is a compressed one, and that the consciousness of the world as a whole has intensified
tremendously (Robertson 1992: 8). The globalization of social reality is a main effect of the rapid evolution
of modern communication means. Today’s world is a ‘global village,’ where people encounter a great
variety of cultural habits, alternative lifestyles and different modes of conduct. Because individualized
people are liberated from the constraints imposed by traditional institutions (e.g., religion), globalization
implies that people can pick and choose what they want from a global cultural marketplace. Globalization,
thus, may be considered favorable to a pluralization of views and diverging ideas because these are
increasingly dependent upon personal convictions and preferences. As van Deth (1995: 4) observed, if
independence and self fulfillment are stressed, people will be inclined to design their own set of values
and choose their orientations ‘à la carte’. It implies increased diversity even in once homogenous groups in
society and value heterogeneity. Van Deth (1995: 4) continues, ‘the emergent ‘postmodern’ cultural order is
marked by value heterogeneity with an emphasis on ‘structures of feeling’ and individual identities based
on differences in lifestyles and tastes’. Thus, we expect that the heterogeneity of people’s value preferences
has increased.
Therefore, we should expect changes not only in value orientations away from traditional views and in
the direction of more individualistic and secular values and a decline in the acceptance of traditional
authoritarian authorities, but we can also expect a growing diversity in these orientations and opinions as a
result of individualization and globalization. This is denoted as the heterogenization or pluralization
hypothesis: ‘an increase in the differences in opinions between individuals’ (Peters 1995: 20).
Data, Measurements and Analytical Strategy
Data
The surveys of the European Values Study from 1981, 1990 and 1999 will be analyzed using the
European and World Values Surveys Four -Wave Integrated Data File, 1981 -2004, v.20060423 (2006; see also
Halman 2001; Inglehart, Basáñez, Díez-Medrano, Halman & Luijkx 2004; Halman, Inglehart, Díez-Medrano,
Luijkx, Moreno & Basáñez 2008; www.europeanvalues.nl). The European Values Study in an international,
longitudinal comparative survey project aiming at exploring values and values changes in contemporary
Europe. The latest wave was conducted in 1999/2000 in almost all European countries. Norway,
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Switzerland, a number of former Yugoslavian countries, and some former Russian countries were not
covered. A new wave is taking place right now (2008; see also www. europeanvalues. nl).
The analyses here are confined to the European countries that were part of all three waves: Sweden,
Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Netherlands, Belgium, West Germany, France,
Spain, Italy and Malta. We restrict the analyses to people aged 18-75. In total, 39 (3 time 13) surveys are
used. The total number of cases is 45, 802. Some surveys are rather small (Northern Ireland and Malta in
1981 and 1990), but on average the size is about 1,200. To make sure that the relative weight of each
country in each wave is in accordance with the relative share in the total population of the thirteen
countries together, we are using population weights. Were available, also design weights are used.
The questionnaire used contained questions on attitudes and opinions in a wide variety of life
domains, including measures for the 5 dimensions we target on: confidence in institutions, religiosity,
moral values, orientations towards family and marriage, and postmaterialism. For more information the
reader is referred to Halman (2001) and the European Values Study website: www.europeanvalues.nl.
Measures
Trust in institutions (TRUST) refers to the level of confidence in traditional institutions: trade unions,
the police, parliament, and the civil service. This measure, like most of the following, is constructed by
means of factor analysis. High factor scores indicate high levels of confidence in these institutions.
Religiosity (RELIGIOS) is measured in terms of beliefs and not in terms of behavior (such as church
attendance) using items as being a religious person, importance of God in one’s life, getting comfort from
religion, and belief in God. High factor scores indicate high levels of religiosity.
Two moral dimensions can be distinguished in EVS: personal sexual morality (SEXPERM) and civic
morality (CIVPERM). The first refers to personal sexual and ethical issues and taps the acceptance of
homosexuality, abortion, divorce, and euthanasia. Malta and Denmark are excluded from this dimension
due to missing data on one of the items. The second refers to public issues such as the acceptance of
illegally claiming state benefits, cheating on taxes, joy riding, and bribery. In quite a number of studies
these two dimensions have been identified by means of factor analysis. High scores on the first factor
indicate high levels of personal sexual morality, while high scores on the second dimension can be
interpreted as high levels of public or civic morality.
With regard to family issues, we will investigate a traditional family pattern (TRADFAM), indicated by
people’s opinions on the need for children to have both a father and a mother to grow up happily, on the
need for women to have children in order to be fulfilled, and on the (dis) approval of women wanting to
have children without stable relationships. Sweden is excluded here due to a missing item. Parent-child
relationships (PARCHILD) are indicated by the views on parents’ duties towards their children and
children’s duties towards their parents. High scores on this dimension reflect not only the opinion that
parents have to do their best for their children even at the cost of their own well-being, but also the view
that children should always love and respect their parents regardless of their parents’ qualities and faults.
The dimension of materialism-postmaterialism (POSTMAT) is based on people’s priorities for either
maintaining order in the nation, giving people more say in important government decisions, fighting rising
prices and protecting freedom of speech, a distinction will be made in pure materialists, mixed and pure
postmaterialists.
Analytical Strategy
A first indication of overall change in orientations can be obtained from a comparison of the mean
scores on the dimensions distinguished. Increasing diversity, i.e., the decreasing homogeneity of values,
can be investigated by examining the distributions of scores indicating a person’s value orientation
(Halman & Pettersson 1996 a, b; Draulans & Halman 2003). For this purpose, we make use of the standard
deviations of the constructs in the three waves. The more people score differently on a given dimension,
the greater the variance and thus the less homogeneous or the more heterogeneous a population is (see
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Figure１．Mean scores on the six value dimensions in 1981, 1990, 1999 for thirteen European countries
also Jagodzinski & Dobbelaere 1995: 226).
Results
The hypothesis on the decline of traditional values/orientations in Europe in the last two decades of
the twentieth century is, at the aggregate level, more or less substantiated (see Fig. 1). As expected, levels
of trust in traditional institutions declined, as well as levels of religiosity, adherence to the traditional family
pattern, and traditional views on parent-child relationships. Sexual permissiveness increased and Europeans
became more postmaterialistic after 1981. Civic permissiveness, however, declined too in the same period
and this was the only clear exception to the trend of declining levels of traditional views and values.
However, changes were not linear. The trend of decline took mainly part during the nineties and were
preceded by increases during the eighties. Religiosity, however, declined more dramatically in the eighties
and continued to decline during the nineties, although at a less pronounced rate. The same, but opposite,
shift occurred with respect to sexual permissiveness. The is a steady increase in this kind of permissiveness
during the eighties and nineties. Although from 1981 to 1999 the orientations with regard to family pattern
and parent child relations changed in the expected direction, that is a decline of traditional views, the
major decline took place during the nineties while the eighties demonstrate the opposite trend of
increasing levels of traditional views. A similar development took place with regard to civic permissiveness.
From 1981 to 1990 this kind of permissiveness increased, but from 1990 to 1999 levels of civic
permissiveness declined. Levels of trust appear to be steadily on the decline, as expected.
Thus, permissiveness with respect to personal sexual ethical issues and behavior increased, as was
expected. The idea was that an ‘ideology of anything goes’ or ‘ethos of everything is possible’ emerged and
indeed permissiveness increased during the previous two decades. A similar expectation was formulated
with respect to deviant and indecent behavior. It is assumed that increasingly such behavior is accepted
because, in an individualized society, people have to decide for themselves, which implies that they have
to allow others to behave differently and in ways that are even deviant from the norms. This hypothesis
cannot be substantiated at the aggregate level. From 1981 to 1990, we see a small increase in this kind of
permissiveness, but from 1990 to 1999, Europeans became stricter towards the issues and behavior
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incorporated in this measure of civic permissiveness.
At first glance, the conclusion should be that the de-traditionalization hypothesis is not corroborated.
European society has not become more lenient, but instead more strict about civic issues and behaviors.
Because the changes are not that dramatic, the conclusion could also be that European society remains as
strict as before. Most of the behaviors included are not acceptable, as becomes clear in Table１，displaying
for the three waves the percentage of respondents claiming that the behavior mentioned can never be
justified (scores 1-3 on the 10 point scales ranging from 1 = never justified, to 10 = always justified).
The overwhelming majority, almost unanimous, does not accept these kinds of behavior, particularly the
misuse of state benefits, joyriding, and bribery. Bribery increasingly appears to be unacceptable for
Europeans, while joyriding was and remained unacceptable to an overwhelming majority of the Europeans.
The idea was that adherence to traditional family patterns would be on the decline. Different kinds of
cohabitation increasingly are accepted and occur frequently, stimulating the assumption that indeed the
traditional forms would be less favorable in European society. In the period between 1981 and 1990 the
popularity of the traditional family pattern increased, while the nineties seem to conform to the ideas as
expressed in our hypotheses. Indeed the traditional pattern was less favored in 1999 than in 1990 and in
1981.
We expected a decline in the traditional parent-child relationships , but this decline only took place in
the nineties, but not in the eighties when we see an increasing popularity of the traditional view of parent-
child relationships.
We also hypothesized increasing levels of postmaterialism . Inglehart’s ideas about the transformation
of society from materialist towards postmaterialist can be confirmed European wide. However, this increase
took place mainly in the period between 1981 and 1990. From 1990 to 1999 postmaterialism was on the
decline.
Table１．Percentages of respondents stating that claiming state benefits illegally,
cheating on taxes, joyriding, and bribery can never or almost never be justified
1981 1990 1999
Illegally claiming state benefits 83 79 80
Cheating on taxes 73 70 74
Joyriding 95 96 96
Bribery 85 88 89
Figure２．Mean scores on postmaterialism in 1981, 1990 and 1999
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We do not find a steady increase in levels of postmaterialism in Europe which is quite unexpected,
since European society experienced a relatively prosperous era and high levels of security.
The heterogenization or pluralization hypothesis states that diversity has grown as a result of growing
individualization and globalization. From the standard deviations displayed in Figure 3, we can evaluate
whether this hypothesis is confirmed or not.
However, in general heterogeneity did not increase. On the contrary, from 1981 to 1999, European
society became (slightly) more homogenous with regard to levels of trust in institutions, civic
permissiveness and hardly changed with regard to views on parent child relations and postmaterialism.
This clearly refutes our expectation. This process of homogenization appears to be not a steady
transformation when it comes to civic permissiveness and trust in institutions. The homogenization trend
was stronger during the eighties and remained more or less at the same level during the nineties.
Also with regard to the other orientations the expectations cannot be corroborated either, or only
partly and then only for the trend in the nineties. From 1981 to 1990 diversity declined but increased from
1990 to 1999 with regard to sexual permissiveness, and both family dimensions. Thus, the trend towards
more heterogeneity is not a continuous trend, but mainly a process that characterized the nineties. In other
words, increasing heterogeneity is a rather recent trend. The opposite is true for religiosity. Europe became
more divers during the eighties and the level of diversity remained more or less the same during the
nineties. The major conclusion from these analyses is that the idea that a process of growing diversity is
taking place in European society has to be refuted.
We theorized that the process of de-traditionalization was not limited to one dimension only, but was
a process that occurred to other dimensions as well. Further we argued that European people would be
increasingly diverse in their views and as such increasing levels of heterogenization were expected in all
dimensions distinguished in this chapter.
The idea that similar processes took place in all domains and all dimensions is answered partly by the
previous analyses and they demonstrate that the evidence is not very strong. It is clear that there was not a
general decline in all traditional values since 1981. During the eighties an opposite trend can be observed.
During the nineties trends in the expected direction of de-traditionalization can be observed, but as such,
the generalization hypothesis cannot be confirmed.
In terms of an increasing heterogeneity, the hypothesis cannot be confirmed for all dimensions either.
Only with regard to levels of religiosity, sexual permissiveness and traditional views on family did European
Figure３．Standard deviations of the value orientations in 1981, 1990, and 1999
５
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people become more diverse, but this was not the case for the other dimensions distinguished in this
chapter. These other dimensions showed increasing levels of diversity in the nineties but homogenization
tendencies during the eighties. These figures cannot be interpreted as a falsification of the hypothesis, but
the evidence is not always in line with our theoretical considerations.
Conclusions
In this paper, we focused on values and value changes in European society. According to
contemporary modernization theories, Western and thus European societies are gradually transforming as a
result of growing individualization, secularization, and globalization. Key issues in these transformation
processes are the de-traditionalization and heterogenization of people’s values. We have explored whether
values have indeed become more individualistic in the sense that traditional preferences are decreasingly
chosen and whether this trend affected all value domains. According to the generalization hypothesis de-
traditionalization is not confined to one single value but has affected orientations in all life domains. We
have focused on topics that seem to be changing most in Western and also probably in non-Western
societies.
The de-traditionalization hypothesis is more or less confirmed. From 1981 to 1999 the traditional views
on religion, institutions, family and morality have declined. However, the eighties often show an opposite
trend compared with the nineties. During the eighties traditionalism increased, while particularly during the
nineties de-traditionalization occurred. The trend of increasing postmaterialism took mainly place during
the eighties and a reversed trend of decline took place during the nineties. So, it has not been a linear
process, but a reversed one during the eighties and it is not easy to find any clues why that has been so.
Most pronounced are the changes with regard to the acceptance of different kinds of sexual behavior.
Increasingly, sexual behavior is considered a personal matter that does not allow the interference of other
people or institutions. This development does not necessarily mean that an ethos of ‘anything goes’ has
developed. Sexual permissiveness has to be understood clearly. It refers to the idea that one accepts and
understands others to be engaged in such behavior, but it does not necessarily imply that people
themselves prefer to behave in such ways. Thus, acceptance and the acceptability of such behavior have
grown. That an ethos of ‘anything goes’ has not evolved in Europe also appears from the low level of
acceptance of deviant and indecent behavior, such as claiming state benefits illegally, cheating on taxes,
joyriding and accepting bribery. Such behavior is rarely accepted by Europeans and some behavior has
become less acceptable during the last two decades.
According to the heterogenization hypothesis, we should find growing levels of diversity as a result of
growing individualization and globalization. We cannot find much evidence to support such claims. We
have seen that a growing diversity in religious beliefs and postmaterialism in the 1980 s turned into a
growing homogeneity in the 1990 s while the reversed trend has been observed with regard to trust in
institutions, sexual permissiveness, and views on family and parent child relations. However, the trends are
not very substantive and only indicate gradual and slow changes in various directions. Which direction the
course takes depends upon the issue at stake.
The generalization hypothesis suggested that a similar process is taking place in all value domains in
European society. Also this hypothesis cannot be confirmed unanimously. However, in most orientations
we observed a shift away from traditional preferences towards more individualistic stances from 1981 to
1999. The period in between however showed a reversed trend of increasing emphasis on traditional
orientations. Others have observed before that the views with regard to family patterns and parent-child
relations had not changed dramatically in either direction. In contrast to the predictions, the traditional
views survived and the old patterns persisted (Van den Akker, Halman & de Moor 1994; Halman 1998).
With regard to family values, Inglehart even noted ‘a reversal of trends’ (1997: 285) showing that the
traditional pattern did not disappear despite the larger individual freedom, emphasis on openness of
society and extended range of opportunities in the domain of family and marriage. It seems as if most
５
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people still value the traditional patterns of family life and thus it seems as if in Europeans’ minds the old
patterns have survived the flows of modernity. What has changed is that people as autonomous individuals
are free and not any longer constraint or forced by traditional institutions. Despite this freedom and liberty,
they the traditional views remained.
As others have indicated (Nauta 1987; Felling, Peters & Scheepers 2000; SCP 2001), de-
traditionalization continues gradually and is not a dramatic instantaneous development. It seems as if
indeed more dramatic changes occurred before the 1980 s, during the ‘exciting,’ ‘turbulent’ 1960 s and
1970s. During these decades, the sexual revolution took place and together with unprecedented levels of
existential security and increasing levels of welfare in European society, peoples’ views on many issues
changed. Particularly the role and position of traditional institutions were no longer taken for granted. The
1980 s and 1990 s do not show stability in values, but also no dramatic value changes. Instead, values
gradually changed in a more individualistic and less traditional direction and it seems as if Europeans
increasingly shared similar values. The current popular view among European people in general and
politicians and culture pessimists in particular is that values are on the decline and slowly disappearing
cannot be substantiated, however. As such, the answer to the question of what has happened to European
values can be answered in two words: not much.
Such an overall conclusion may be rejected when it comes to the particular trends in values that took
place in the different countries. We have seen that countries differ to the degree that the populations are
active in voluntary organizations and trends in European countries differ also in different age groups (see
Halman 2003: 193). In another setting we have analyzed the Dutch trends in the orientations described
here (Halman & Luijkx 2008). Although the very general conclusion that no dramatic changes have taken
place could also be drawn for the Netherlands, the patterns of change are not always in the direction
shown in this chapter covering all European countries. At other places we have concluded that Europe is
not a homogeneous area when it comes to values (Arts, Hagenaars & Halman 2003; Arts & Halman 2004;
Halman, Luijkx & Van Zundert 2005), and also trajectories of change appear to be ‘path-dependent’. As
Inglehart and Baker (2000) have shown, although societies develop in similar directions, the trajectories
they follow differ from country to country, dependent upon a multitude of factors, being cultural,
structural, political or economical. This is the more reason to explore the trajectories in Europe taking into
account such varieties between countries.
Finally, the data collection within the framework of the fourth European Values Study in 2008 (see
www.europeanvalues.nl) will provide a wealth of data that can be analyzed to explore further whether
values are indeed changing in the predicted direction. At this moment the data collection takes place and
we have to wait until the data of this immense project will become available for analyses to elaborate on
the transformation processes that are taking place in contemporary Europe.
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Value Change in Western European Societies
Results from the European Values Study
ABSTRACT
According to contemporary modernization theories, Western and thus European
societies are gradually transforming as a result of growing individualization, secularization,
and globalization. Key issues in these transformation processes are the de-traditionalization
and heterogenization of people’s values. Analyses of the survey data from the European
Values Study in 1981, 1990 and 1999 do not yield much evidence of vast changes. The
trends appear not very substantive and seem to reveal gradual and rather slow changes in
various directions. Which direction the course of changes takes depends upon the
particular issue at stake. All in all it must be concluded that the answer to the question of
what has happened to European values can be answered in two words: not much.
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